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ABSTRACT
Although there are considerably more men than women in most parliaments
around the world, we know little about whether male-dominated legislatures
neglect women’s policy preferences. Our article addresses this gap by
analysing the congruence of policy preferences between women, men and
their elected representatives. We endeavour to answer two questions. Are
women’s policy preferences underrepresented in modern democracies? If so,
which factors explain the size of the gender gaps in policy preference
congruence? Comparing 21 European countries, we show that women’s
preferences actually tend to be more accurately represented in parliaments
than those of men. Moreover, our analyses reveal that this unanticipated
finding is not driven by the share of female office-holders, but rather by levels
of women’s turnout, which leads us to conclude that who votes is more
important than who represents for policy preference congruence.
KEY WORDS Gender equality; policy preference congruence; substantive representation; women.
Introduction
one of the bedrock principles in a democracy is the equal consideration of the
preferences and interests of all citizens. (Verba 2003: 663)
Despite their numerical underrepresentation in the parliaments and assem-
blies in modern democracies, are women’s policy preferences equally well
reflected by elected officials compared to those of men? Women tend to
care about issues pertaining to reproductive rights, gender equality and
other feminist matters that are usually underrepresented in parliaments
(Dahlerup 1988; Mansbridge 1999; McAllister and Studlar 1992; Sawer 2012;
Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Wängnerud and Sundell 2012). Taking
aside issues that directly relate to gender, women exhibit more liberal
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ideological orientations than men (Gidengil et al. 2003; Inglehart and Norris
2000), so that gender imbalances in presence could easily translate into
poor representation of their preferences. This article examines how the rep-
resentation of women’s policy preferences differs from those of men across
a broad variety of policy fields, as well as the factors shaping this relationship.
For this purpose, we compare the level of congruence of policy preferences by
exploring the extent to which positions in parliaments correspond to and
reflect those of both genders (Monroe 1979; Powell 2000). Since parliaments
are lopsided in favour of male representatives, it would be fair to expect that
policy preference congruence would also favour male preferences. To date,
however, this relationship has received scant empirical verification.
To tackle the issue of substantive representation, this study adopts a
multidimensional concept of women’s preferences, covering seven policy
areas – views on the free market, welfare state redistribution, the environ-
ment, lifestyles, immigration, multiculturalism and religious principles – to
capture the diversity of women’s policy positions outside traditional feminist
issues. This approach widens the scope of inquiry well beyond existing
research, which examines either parliamentary interventions and advocacy
on behalf of women (e.g., Dahlerup 2006; Sawer 2012; Schwindt-Bayer and
Mishler 2005; Studlar and McAllister 2002; Swers 2002), or congruence
between voters and élites on left–right placements (e.g., Bernauer et al.
2015; Blais and Bodet 2006; Golder and Stramski 2010; Powell 2000, 2009).
It is widely believed that the gender of elected representatives influences
their legislative preferences (e.g., Burrell 1994; Norris and Lovenduski 1995).
Hence, equality in numbers between male and of female legislators –
gender balanced descriptive representation – is frequently interpreted as a
necessary condition for the meaningful representation of their preferences
– substantive representation (Phillips 1995). Our analyses, which build on
both the European Values Study and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey in 21 Euro-
pean countries, yield unanticipated results. We find no support for the claim
that women’s policy preferences should be less accurately represented com-
pared to those of men in male-dominated legislatures. Quite the contrary,
congruence of policy preferences is, at times, closest between women and
parliamentary representatives. Moreover, other than one would expect, we
do not find the highest levels of preference congruence within the group
of countries where women assume the largest share of seats. Instead, the
most decisive factor for preference congruence we identify is women’s
turnout in national elections. In countries where women vote at higher
rates than men, elected legislatures mirror women’s policy preferences
more closely. Who votes is hence more consequential than who represents
for congruence. This finding carries profound implications for research on
gender equality in politics, as it suggests that the causal linkage between
women’s presence and substantive representation is neither as proximal as
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previously hypothesized, nor is it circumscribed to specific feminist issues.
When we consider a more diverse set of policy preferences transcending typi-
cally gendered issues, we find a much higher level of substantive represen-
tation than expected, despite comparably low levels of presence.
Policy preference congruence and women’s representation
The fundamental question of whether women’s policy preferences are under-
represented in modern democracies lies at the core of this article. A vast body
of research leads us to expect that the answer is a definite ‘yes’. Assuming that
elected officials should respond to the public’s policy preferences within
specific areas (e.g., Monroe 1979), the first set of studies addressing this
issue considers substantive representation in terms of degrees of congruence
in policy preferences between citizens and their representatives. Researchers
in this field examine the correspondence between citizens’ preferences and
those of parliaments and governments in different institutional settings
(e.g., Blais and Bodet 2006; Budge and McDonald 2007; Gilens 2005; Golder
and Stramski 2010; Powell 2000; Powell and Vanberg 2000). A related and
growing set of literature analyses the representational bias between various
sub-populations and parliaments (e.g., Giger et al. 2012; Griffin and
Newman 2005; Griffin et al. 2012) as well as policy outcomes (Branham
et al. 2017; Enns 2015; Gilens and Page 2014; Rigby and Wright 2013). This
research shows that the preferences of historically disadvantaged and
excluded groups are least well represented by elected officials and through
enacted policies. Contributors identify a general trend of preference underre-
presentation of minorities (Griffin and Newman 2007), non-voters (e.g., Camp-
bell 2003; Griffin and Newman 2005; Tate 2003), and relatively poor citizens on
the one hand (e.g., Bartels 2008; Branham et al. 2017; Ellis 2012; Enns 2015;
Giger et al. 2012; Gilens 2005; Miller and Stokes 1963; Rigby and Wright
2013), and a preference overrepresentation of economic élites and organized
groups in policy outcomes on the other (Gilens and Page 2014). Analysing
ideological congruence of women and political parties on a left–right scale,
Bernauer et al. (2015) provide evidence suggesting that parliaments mirror
the ideological positioning of men and women equally well. Yet, the degree
to which women are represented in substantive terms hinges on contextual
factors: more conservative parties, such as the Republicans in the United
States, have been found to better represent policy preferences of men in
roll-call voting while Liberal parties, such as the Democrats, tend to better
reflect those of women (Griffin et al. 2012).
Beyond studies on congruence, the bulk of research addressing factors
facilitating women’s substantive representation (e.g., the role of institutional
settings or political attitudes) demonstrates that representative bodies are
biased towards the preferences of men (McAllister and Studlar 1992; Sawer
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2012; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Wängnerud and Sundell 2012). These
different studies thus lend support to the expectation that the preferences of
women, a traditionally disadvantaged group, should lead to an overrepresen-
tation of men’s preferences.
H1: Policy preference congruence between women and parliaments is lower
than between men and parliaments.
Moving beyond description, which factors can explain variation in the size of
the gender gap in policy preference congruence in a country? The literature
provides manifold explanations as to how structural disadvantages outside
the legislative arena, for instance lower levels of involvement in non-voting
forms of political participation or in organized interest groups, lead to the
underrepresentation of women’s preferences (e.g., Kittilson and Schwindt-
Bayer 2012; Verba et al. 1997). However, for the purpose of this paper, the
ensuing section focuses on the most important factors inﬂuencing gender
equality in substantive representation: presence of women in parliament
and turnout.
The ‘politics of presence’ argument by Phillips (1995) suggests that
women’s numerical strength in parliaments – descriptive representation –
influences the degree to which these elected bodies promote women’s
policy preferences. Central to this argument is the idea that the presence of
women in parliaments changes the policy-making process. For example,
feminist issues are more likely to be brought to the fore as the share of
female legislators in elected assemblies increases (Dahlerup 1988; Dovi
2002; Mansbridge 1999; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Sawer 2012; Schwindt-
Bayer and Mishler 2005; Studlar and McAllister 2002; Swers 2002; Wängnerud
and Sundell 2012). Moreover, women legislators are more likely to support
liberal policies (Burrell 1994), hold liberal attitudes (McAllister and Studlar
1992), and are instrumental in promoting policies that enhance gender
quality (Vallance and Davis 1986).
Yet, a number of scholars challenge this straightforward relationship
between descriptive and substantive representation. Some argue that critical
actors (Chaney 2006; Childs and Krook 2006; Sawer 2012), the positional
power of women (Heath et al. 2005), party affiliation and ideology (e.g.,
Griffin et al. 2012; McAllister and Studlar 1992), or the broader legislative
and societal context (e.g., Chaney 2006; Wängnerud and Sundell 2012)
exert a more direct causal impact on the representation of women’s policy
preferences. While these studies bring additional nuance to clarify the
relationship between descriptive and substantive representation, they do
not dispute the underlying rationale that the increasing presence of women
in parliaments transforms institutional norms, political discourse and the
policy agenda. These considerations inform the second hypothesis of our
article:
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H2: The fewer women elected to parliaments, the lower the policy preference
congruence between women and parliaments.
The second potential factor explaining levels of congruence between women
and their representatives lies in different propensities to vote. Traditionally,
gender gaps in participation were characterized by men turning out to vote
in larger proportions than women. Yet, several contributors argue that this
gap has been narrowing over time in many countries. In some cases, the
gap has even been overturned (Henderson and Jeydel 2010; Inglehart and
Norris 2003; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012). If men and women display
different propensities to engage in political participation, the preferences of
the more numerous group at the polls should be more accurately mirrored
in parliaments. A vote surplus for one gender should translate into a higher
impact on the decision as to which candidates or parties win seats, leaving
the policy-making process gendered in favour of the interests and policy pre-
ferences of this group. If the proximity of voters to a party’s policy position
inﬂuences the choice at the ballot box (Downs 1957), sincere voters should
support the party whose position is closest to their own. Therefore, if
female voters constitute half of the electorate, politicians should be inclined
to represent women’s interests.
H3: The higher women’s level of turnout, the higher the policy preference
congruence between women and parliaments.
Empirical strategy
Our analyses follow a two-staged strategy to test the three hypotheses elabo-
rated in the previous section. In a first step, we examine whether women’s
preferences are underrepresented. In the second step, we investigate which
factors explain the size of the gender gaps we uncover. To this end, we
draw on data from 21 European countries covering the years from 2005 to
2010.1 Our data set encompasses 62 observations – policy areas nested in
countries – and is characterized by broad variation in the key variables of
interest: the share of female office-holders; the gap in electoral participation
between men and women; as well as the gender gap in policy represen-
tation.2 Since institutional and socioeconomic contexts across the countries
in the sample remain comparable, they provide ideal testing grounds for a
large-scale comparison and broad generalization potential.
Measuring the gender gap in policy representation
Previous research on women’s substantive representation has focused on the
advancement of feminist issues such as reproductive rights, childcare, access
to employment and equal pay, while the bulk of contributions on overall
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substantive representation has concentrated on citizen–parliament congru-
ence in the left–right ideological dimension. Both approaches are fraught
with difficulties. The first cluster of research rests on the problematic assump-
tion that women’s core concerns revolve around a predefined set of policy
fields pertaining to their position in society. With the exclusive focus on a uni-
dimensional ideological space, such as the left–right, the second group of
contributors also risks oversimplifying policy preferences (Ganghof 2015).
Building on the insights from both literatures, yet seeking to overcome
some of their limitations, we propose a conceptualization of substantive rep-
resentation as citizen–parliament congruence in multiple general policy areas
in which both men’s and women’s policy preferences actually vary.3 With this
approach, we avoid making essentializing assumptions about uniform inter-
ests for all women in all countries, which many have criticized (e.g., Celis
2006: 88; Celis and Childs 2012: 216; Mackay 2008: 126). Moreover, this strat-
egy allows moving beyond unidimensional ideological arenas.
Measuring the congruence between voters and members of parliament
(MPs) requires overlapping data sources for the policy positions of both sets
of actors on a series of policy fields. To measure the policy preference distri-
bution of legislators we use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) from 2010
(Bakker et al. 2015), which assesses the degree to which parties support or
oppose a certain policy. We then weight the scores by the parties’ seat
share in the previous election. Relying on parties’ policy positions requires
us to make the assumption that MPs from the same party share the same
ideological preferences (Golder and Stramski 2010: 98). To identify the
policy preferences of men and women, we draw on the European Values
Study (EVS 2008), which covers most countries included in the CHES (Online
Appendix 4 lists all EVS and CHES items). The survey asks respondents to
position themselves regarding a series of policies as liberal or conservative.
Combining the two data sources allows us to cover seven policy areas for
both parties and voters that are standard enough to expect that respondents
hold reflected policy preferences and perceive them as salient. These areas
encompass policies concerning:
. traditional socioeconomic topics including issue attitudes towards (1) the
free market (state regulation or freedom of firms) and (2) redistribution;
. post-materialist value orientations regarding (3) the environment (environ-
mental protection or economic growth) and (4) lifestyles (liberal or conser-
vative positions on homosexuality, abortion, and soft drugs);
. cultural issues covering (5) immigration (restrictive or free movement), (6)
multiculturalism (assimilation or diversity) and (7) the role of religious prin-
ciples in politics (strict separation of religion and politics or guiding func-
tion of religion).
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To compare men and women’s policy preferences with parliamentary party
positions on these seven policy areas, we exploit Golder and Stramski’s (2010)
concept of ‘many-to-many’ ideological congruence between a group of citi-
zens and a collective body of representatives. Rather than simply comparing
the absolute distance between citizens’ and representatives’median positions
on issues, this approach to measuring congruence compares the entire fre-
quency distributions of citizens’ and MPs’ positions, thereby allowing the
most accurate estimate of congruence by considering the variance around
the middle position.4 For the purpose of this article, we derive our measure
for many-to-many congruence by superimposing the frequency distribution
of citizens’ answers to the European Value Study policy items and MPs’ pos-
itions according to the CHES ranking of their parties.5
Figure 1 illustrates this idea using the example of preferences for redistri-
bution in the Netherlands. The preference distribution of women and MPs
is displayed on the left and shows that the parliament is slightly more leftist
than female citizens, e.g., representatives are more in favour of redistribution
measures than women. Many-to-many congruence of women and parlia-
ments means calculating the size of the grey-shaded area between the distri-
butions of MPs and women. The figure on the right-hand side shows the
preference distribution of men and MPs, and many-to-many congruence of
Figure 1. Density function of MPs, women’s and men’s policy preferences on redistribu-
tion in the Netherlands. Notes: The figure shows the kernel density function, the fre-
quency is weighted by one hundred in order to provide percentage and simplify
interpretation.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 7
men and parliaments. It demonstrates that the policy preferences of men
regarding redistribution in the Netherlands are less accurately represented
by parliaments than those of women, since the gap between the preference
distributions of men and legislators is larger than between those of women
and parliaments. If congruence is perfect, there are no differences in the fre-
quency distributions and the congruence measure takes the value 0. The
more parliaments and citizens diverge, the larger the measure grows and
the lower many-to-many congruence becomes (with the value 2 indicating
maximum deviation).
In the first step of our empirical analyses, we compare the means of many-
to-many congruence of women and men. In order to obtain a single measure
capturing the gender gap for each observation, we further divide the congru-
ence of women and parliaments by the congruence of men and parliaments.
This gendered congruence ratio takes the value 1 if the level of congruence of
women and parliaments is the same as of men and parliaments. Values
smaller than 1 point to a gender gap in which women’s preferences are
more accurately reflected in parliaments (as in the situation displayed in the
example above), and values larger than 1 indicate an overrepresentation of
men’s policy preferences.
Explanatory variables
The analyses comprise two explanatory variables in order to shed light on the
variation in the policy gender gap: women’s descriptive representation and
turnout. To test hypothesis 2, we include the proportion of women in the
lower house holding office after the last election before 2010 as provided
by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2016).6 To measure the gendered differ-
ences in turnout and test for the third hypothesis, we analyse self-reported
participation according to the EVS.7 The survey asks respondents whether
they would vote if there was an election the next day. We calculate the
share of men and women who report planning to cast a ballot for each
country and subtract the share of female from male voters.
Control variables
Beyond these explanatory variables, we control for numerous factors ident-
ified by previous research as affecting policy preference congruence: policy
fields, institutional, and socio-economic factors.
Policy fields
A dummy variable for each of the seven policy fields takes the value 1 if an
observation belongs to a policy field and 0 otherwise. We anticipate the
gender gap in policy preferences to vary in size across the seven policy
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areas, even though the existing literature does not allow us to formulate
precise expectations about the direction in which the effects might occur
(Gidengil 1995).
Institutional factors
First, we control for the proportionality of the electoral system using the mean
district magnitude from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001),
which is calculated as the weighted average of the number of MPs per district.
More permissive electoral systems display a higher dispersion of parties with
regard to the electorate’s distribution of ideological positions (Dow 2011) and
promote higher levels of interest, involvement and participation of women
(Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012). A higher degree of proportionality
should hence go hand in hand with a closer reflection of women’s preferences
in parliament. Second, we control for ballot structure: a dummy variable takes
the value 1 for closed list electoral systems and 0 for open list systems (Beck
et al. 2001). Closed list systems do not allow voters to punish single represen-
tatives, which might lead to women’s underrepresentation in substantive
terms (Valdini 2012). Third, as larger parliaments tend to yield more pro-
portional electoral outcomes (Lijphart 1986) and allow for the representation
of broader policy preferences, the models include the number of parliamen-
tary seats (Beck et al. 2001). Following Salmond (2006), we calculate the logar-
ithm for this variable: increases at low values should make a bigger difference
for proportionality than at large values. As a last institutional factor, we include
the share of left-wing parties in each parliament (Bakker et al. 2015) assuming
that left-wing parties present themselves as advocates of disadvantaged
groups such as women (Caul 1999; Krook and Childs 2010).
Socio-economic factors
Our models include the share of women in the work force (World Bank 2016).
Societies with higher rates of women in the work force tend to be more liberal,
more open to women’s representation (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 138) and
should, thus, better represent women’s preferences. Furthermore, we
include a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country belongs to Central and
Eastern Europe (0 if otherwise). Owing to their lower democratic experience,
these parliaments might be less open to the representation of women’s policy
preferences (e.g., Moser 2001). The gender gap should consequently be larger
in these countries to the detriment of women.
The gender gap in policy preference congruence: evidence from
21 European countries
In the first step of our empirical analyses, we explore whether women’s policy
preferences are underrepresented in parliaments compared to those of men.
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Table 1 displays paired t-tests for mean comparisons of women-parliament
and men-parliament congruence for all observations as well as by policy
area.8 Contrary to what the bulk of literature leads us to expect, women’s pre-
ferences are marginally better represented than those of men: the measure of
congruence between men and parliaments is higher than between women
and parliaments. Keeping in mind that higher values indicate a lower level
of preference congruence, the preferences of men diverge more from those
of MPs than those of women. This difference is smaller than zero and
reaches conventional levels of statistical significance, which suggests that
women’s policy preferences are more accurately mirrored by the elected legis-
lators than those of men. This allows us to reject our first hypothesis, and with
it the conventional wisdom, that parliaments discount women’s policy
preferences.
Turning to policy fields, preferences concerning religious principles, redis-
tribution and free market display a particularly broad gap, reaching high levels
of statistical significance despite the low numbers of cases in each category.
For example, in Sweden, women’s preferred policies regarding lifestyles
(including issues such as homosexual marriage, abortion policies and legaliza-
tion of soft drugs) are considerably more accurately mirrored in parliament
than those of men. More precisely, the congruence measure of women and
parliaments is 24 per cent lower than the equivalent for men, which is the
largest gender gap in congruence of policy preferences in our sample. We
observe the second- and third-largest gaps in policy preference congruence
in Lithuania (23 per cent) regarding the question of whether religious prin-
ciples should guide politicians and in Denmark (21 per cent) concerning the
preferred extent of redistribution policies. In all three situations, the congru-
ence measure exhibits a larger deviation between men and parliaments
than women and parliaments; in other words, more congruent representation
of women’s policy preferences.
It is important to underline that congruence between the two genders and
parliaments varies systematically across policy fields. Parliaments reflect men’s
preferences for limited environmental protection better than women’s
Table 1. Paired t-tests for mean differences between women–parliament and men–
parliament congruence for all observations and separately for each policy field.
Obs. Women (mean) Men (mean) Difference p-value
all 62 1.08 1.13 −0.05 0.00
Free market 11 1.10 1.15 −0.05 0.00
Environment 4 1.44 1.41 0.03 0.18
Immigration 5 1.03 1.05 −0.02 0.36
Multiculturalism 6 1.17 1.16 0.01 0.72
Redistribution 13 1.16 1.20 −0.04 0.04
Religious principle 17 0.93 1.02 −0.09 0.00
Lifestyles 7 1.05 1.10 −0.05 0.20
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preferences for strong state intervention. MPs also consistently underrepre-
sent women’s preference for openness to a multicultural society. While this
suggests the presence of idiosyncratic processes specific to each policy field
– the investigation of which lie outside of the scope of the present article
owing to limitations in data points – the markers indicate that women’s pre-
ferences are more accurately represented in the remaining policy fields.
Factors determining variation in the gender gap: turnout and
descriptive representation
In the second stage of our analysis, we now explain the variation in the size
of policy preference congruence between parliaments and the two genders.
For this purpose, we use the gendered congruence ratio measure devel-
oped in the previous section as a dependent variable for the ensuing ana-
lyses. This variable captures the degree of correspondence between
women’s policy preferences and parliaments relative to the congruence
between men and elected officials. Model 1 in Table 2 displays a baseline
ordinary least squares regression model with our core variables of interest
to test hypotheses 2 and 3, while the remaining models integrate three
sets of control variables.
We notice that a higher share of female legislators is associated with only
slightly higher levels of congruence between parliaments’ orientations and
women’s policy preferences compared to those of men (see Table 2). The
coefficient displays a negative sign throughout all models, but the effect is
weak and fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance as
visible in Figure 2(a) plotting the marginal effect. Notwithstanding the
absence of statistical significance, our models estimate that 10 per cent
more female MPs have the effect of decreasing the deviation between
women–parliament policy preferences by 0.8 per cent relative to the gap
between men and parliaments. In other words, whether a parliament has
many or few women affects the predicted congruence ratio only marginally.
The ‘politics of presence’ argument, and the corollary hypothesis that unba-
lanced women’s descriptive representation leads to the overrepresentation
of men’s preferences, when operationalized as congruence, receives very
limited empirical support.
With regard to hypothesis 3, the gender gap in turnout stands out as the
one and only explanatory variable that retains statistical significance at
the conventional level throughout all model specifications.9 In a nutshell,
the more women turn out to vote, the better their preferences are reflected
in parliaments. Figure 2(b) displays the marginal effect of gender differences
in turnout on the gender gap in preference congruence (based on Model 1).
Even if women’s turnout is 9 percentage points lower than that of men – as in
the case of Latvia – the model predicts a gendered congruence ratio slightly
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above 1, which implies that parliaments represent the policy preferences of
men and women equally well. As electoral participation of women increases,
the ratio falls below 1 and indicates a bias towards the preferences of women.
In Portugal, where female electoral participation exceeds male participation
by 8 per cent, the congruence measure is 10 per cent higher for men and par-
liaments than for women and parliaments, meaning that it clearly favours
women. In our group of 21 European democracies, higher levels of female
turnout compared to that of men lead to more congruent representation of
women’s policy preference in parliaments, which is consistent with Griffin
and Newman’s (2005) finding that voters are better represented by elected
officials than non-voters in the United States.
We ran a series of additional models, introducing control variables, in order
to rule out confounding variables as explanations. The parameter estimates
for the share of women in parliaments and the gendered differences in
turnout (our key variables of interest) remain unchanged by the introduction
of any of these control variables, indicating that our results are robust to
alternative specifications.10
Table 2. Linear regression of the gendered congruence ratio on the share of women in
parliament and the gender gap in turnout with different sets of control variables.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Main explanatory variables
% women in parliament −0.0008
(0.0009)
−0.0010
(0.0008)
−0.0009
(0.0010)
−0.0015
(0.0014)
Gender gap in turnout −0.0055***
(0.0012)
−0.0037**
(0.0017)
−0.0056***
(0.0018)
−0.0058***
(0.0013)
Policy area
Environment 0.0789***
(0.0203)
Multiculturalism 0.0692**
(0.0328)
Institutional control variables
Mean District Magnitude −0.0001
(0.0001)
Closed lists −0.0081
(0.0221)
Number of parliamentary seats (log) 0.0052
(0.0144)
% seats for left-wing parties 0.0004
(0.0007)
Socioeconomic controls
% women in work force 0.0004
(0.0017)
Central and Eastern European country −0.0149
(0.0145)
Constant 0.9745***
(0.0196)
0.9693***
(0.0178)
0.9402***
(0.0901)
0.9961***
(0.0315)
Observations 62 62 62 62
R2 0.084 0.209 0.096 0.088
Notes: All models are simple linear regressions, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; standard errors are clus-
tered at the country level.
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Model 2 incorporates policy preferences in matters of the environment and
multiculturalism following the comparison of means presented in Table 1,
indicating that women’s preferences are less accurately reflected than
men’s in these policy fields. The results of these additional controls suggest
that parliaments match men’s policy preferences better than those of
women in these fields, while the relationship is reversed for religious prin-
ciples, deregulation, redistribution, the free market and lifestyles.11 Model 3
and 4 integrate a series of country-level variables, yet none of these additional
factors exerts a statistically significant effect on the gendered congruence
ratio. Even though the institutional setting and the socioeconomic context
are the central factors explaining the level of correspondence between all citi-
zens and their elected representatives, as documented in a large literature,
these factors lose their explanatory power when we seek to account for differ-
ences between genders.
Conclusions
This article contributes to theoretical and normative debates about the quality
of women’s substantive representation in parliaments and the extent to which
women’s turnout and descriptive representation help us to understand differ-
ent patterns of congruence in policy preferences. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, which suggests a general underrepresentation of women in terms
Figure 2. Linear predictionof the gendered congruence ratio for a) the proportionofwomen
in parliaments, and b) the gender gaps in turnout with 95 per cent confidence intervals.
Notes: Estimations based on Model 1 in Table 2.
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of substantive representation, we find that parliaments tend to mirror
women’s policy preferences slightly more accurately than those of men in
the countries we have analysed, with the notable exception of two policy
fields, environment and multiculturalism. This finding is at odds with most
previous research analysing both the level of correspondence between parlia-
ments and traditionally disadvantaged or excluded groups (Bartels 2008; Ellis
2012; Gilens 2005; Giger et al. 2012; Miller and Stokes 1963) and the inclusion
of feminist issues on the legislative agenda (McAllister and Studlar 1992;
Sawer 2012; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Wängnerud and Sundell
2012). Our analyses validate the notion that there is great diversity in what
women expect from elected officials (Beckwith 2014): women’s preferences
on mainstream policy issues, on the one hand, and gender-specific topics,
on the other, lead to different conclusions about gender equality in represen-
tation. While most parliaments might still discount feminist issues for the
various reasons explored in the literature, paradoxically, elected officials in
Western European countries largely mirror of women’s preferences concern-
ing immigration, religious principles, redistribution, the free market and
lifestyles.
We find little support for the ‘politics of presence’ argument. Our ana-
lyses show that the share of female office-holders does not have a clear
effect on the degree to which parliaments mirror women’s preferences.
Although female officeholders have been found to transform institutional
norms, political discourse and the policy agenda (Dahlerup 1988; Dovi
2002; Mansbridge 1999; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Sawer 2012;
Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Studlar and McAllister 2002; Swers
2002; Wängnerud and Sundell 2012), descriptive representation is not a
necessary condition for substantive representation. Our study therefore pro-
vides key evidence clarifying the relationship between the different dimen-
sions of representation. If substantive representation is understood as
congruence in policy preferences, the causal linkage between descriptive
and substantive representation is not as proximal as previously thought,
because male and female MPs are equally willing and able to take up
women’s heterogeneous policy preferences. For other dimensions of rep-
resentation, women’s presence in parliaments, as well as their role as critical
actors, still carries some weight (e.g., Childs and Krook 2006; Griffin et al.
2012; Heath et al. 2005). Most importantly, the share of women in elected
office can influence other facets of substantive representation, in particular
the promotion of women’s issues such as gender equality, maternity, child-
care or equal pay. Moreover, the descriptive representation of women in
parliaments also generates symbolic representation and promotes justice
(Alexander 2012; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995).
While the representation of women’s policy preferences is not a direct
function of their numerical strength in parliaments, it is still contingent on
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another form of presence: women in the electorate and their propensity to
turn out to vote. The more women turn out to vote in parliamentary elections,
the better parliaments reflect their preferred issue opinions. Only in the few
countries where women constitute less than half the electorate, for
example Latvia, do we witness a closing of the gender gap in policy prefer-
ence congruence, with women’s policy preferences being on par with those
of men. Women’s higher vote shares make them decisive factors for which
party will assume a larger share of the seats. However, the composition of
turnout might not only affect the election of representatives, but also policy
agendas of parliaments as well as policy content (Lijphart 1997). According
to this rationale, vote-maximizing parties should be motivated to closely
reflect the policy preferences of the majority of their electorate and thus
move the content of their party manifestos closer to voters’ ideal points.
Hence, if the electorate is biased in terms of gender, income, age or ethnic
background, legislatures might be biased as well as a consequence of shifting
policy content concerning substantial issues, such as redistribution towards
the preferences of the dominating group. Yet, the question whether electo-
rates influence the preferences of élites or whether the causal arrow points
the other way around – that parliaments send cues to the voters, who
adapt their preferences according to their policy offers – remains unanswered.
To address this question, temporal analyses capturing the extent to which
changes in the composition of turnout shape parliaments’ policy orientation
offer promising avenues for future research.
Notes
1. Online Appendix 1 lists all countries and years included in the analyses.
2. Data documentation and summary statistics for all variables are listed in Online
Appendices 2 and 3.
3. The inclusion of a policy area for a country in which there is no difference
between male and female preferences would lead to an overestimation of
equality in representation. We identified cases where policy preferences
between men and women differ using t-tests (5 per cent level, results in
Online Appendix 4). To ascertain that this case selection strategy does not
affect results, the main model of this article was estimated using two alternative
samples including all observations with a statistically significant gender gap in
policy preferences (1) in t-tests (10 per cent level, Online Appendix 7, Test 1)
and (2) in Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests (Online Appendix 7, Test 2).
4. To ensure that this operationalization does not drive the findings, we conducted
a robustness check (see Online Appendix 7, Test 6) using a difference measure as
dependent variable. In addition, we consider alternative survey items as
measures for citizens’ policy preferences (see Online Appendix 2 for details
and Online Appendix 7, Test 5 for findings).
5. To calculate the congruence measure items, party and voters’ positions must be
measured on the same scale. Since CHES does not report integer numbers, we
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rescaled and rounded party positions of CHES data to adapt them to the EVS’s
scale. Details are reported in Online Appendix 2.
6. We conducted two additional robustness tests (Online Appendix 7, Tests 7 and
8) using the share of women in parliaments during the same legislative period as
the CHES or the previous legislative period. This different operationalization
does not change the findings presented.
7. Following a similar approach as previous studies (e.g., Brady et al. 1995; Norris
2003), our analyses only include individuals who report voting intentions.
While voting intention is biased upwards in surveys, previous research does
not find systematic gender gaps in overreporting of voting (Karp and Brocking-
ton 2005).
8. Online Appendix 6 contains country-specific information on men-parliament
and women-parliament congruence.
9. When using Jackknife standard errors rather than robust standard errors, the
level of statistical significance for the parameter estimate of the gender gap in
turnout decreases to p = 0.015. Online Appendix 7, Test 13 reports the results
of this robustness check.
10. We tested for additional variables and combinations of control variables (Online
Appendix 7, Tests 9–12), but the robustness tests do not present evidence jus-
tifying other models.
11. We estimated separate models with additional value-based policy areas (reli-
gious principles, multiculturalism, lifestyles and redistribution) and other rel-
evant areas (environment, free market, immigration), located in Online
Appendix 7, Tests 3 and 4. We further provide separate models for all policy
areas in Online Appendix 7, Tests 14–20.
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